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A B S T R A C T
How do workers in different age groups fare on the labor market when a banking crisis occurs? Using data on 41
banking crises in 38 developed countries between 1990 and 2014, we examine how banking crises affect the
labor market position of workers from five different age groups (including those aged 65 years and older) and
whether employment protection legislation shields workers from unemployment. Results show that un-
employment increases for all age groups in the aftermath of banking crises, but much more so for younger
workers. The labor force participation of older women increases significantly in the medium run, whereas older
men close to retirement withdraw from the labor market. Countries with strong employment protection legis-
lation shield workers from the impact of banking crises in the short run but show signs of increases in un-
employment rates for young and middle-aged workers in the medium run.
Introduction
How do younger and older workers fare in the labor market when
banking crises occur? This simple question gained prominence during
the Great Recession. The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 set
in motion a series of long run consequences, which at the time were
clouded by uncertainty and speculation. It became soon clear that the
credit crunch was real and affected many financial institutions around
the world. But how exactly do banking crises affect the real economy?
Problems within financial institutions are highly likely to translate into
economic and societal consequences that will have to be borne by
someone and the effects may be more long lasting compared to other
forms of recession not caused by a banking crisis (Bernal-Verdugo et al.,
2013). The consequences of a banking crisis can also cascade on to
employers and employees outside of the financial industry. Dell'Ariccia
et al. (2008) show that banking crises have an independent negative
effect on the real economy as approximated by highly aggregated
measures like real employment growth and value-added growth.
However, these measures do not provide us with much detail on how
different groups in society are affected.
A significant issue in countries undergoing population ageing is how
different age groups in the labor market fare in the aftermath of a
banking crisis. In this study, we assess how unemployment rates and
labor force participation rates for different age groups of workers are
affected by banking crises in 38 developed countries between 1990 and
2014. An important reason for specifically focusing on banking crises
and not recessions in general is that banking crises tend to be longer-
lasting and more severe than normal recessions (which typically last
less than a year; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). This is because bank
distress aggravates economic problems in other sectors through reduced
access to credit (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008). Furthermore, banking crises
tend to be characterized by deep and prolonged collapses of housing
and stock markets. In such circumstances, the unemployment con-
sequences for households are even more important to understand, since
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households may simultaneously be exposed to these asset market
shocks (Claessens et al., 2009). In this respect, banking crises offer a
good testing ground for how different age groups, protected to various
degrees by employment protection legislation, fare in the aftermath of a
severe downturn. For example, in highly protected countries older
workers may not experience any of the consequences of a normal re-
cession.
The focus of this paper is on labor markets as one of the important
macroeconomic transmission channels of a crisis. Two questions stand
out: (i) which age group(s) of workers suffers most from a banking crisis
in the short and medium run? and (ii) To what extent does employment
protection legislation offer real protection from the impact of banking
crises on unemployment?
Our analysis focuses on a sample of 38 countries over the period
1990–2014, for which we obtain yearly data on the occurrence of a
banking crisis from Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a, 2009b, 2011 and from
Laeven and Valencia (2013) and yearly data on the unemployment rate
and the labor force participation rate for men and women in five dif-
ferent age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–54, 55–64, 65 and older). Over
our sample period, these 38 countries experienced a total of 41 in-
dividual banking crisis periods. Although some of these crises are
common across a number of these countries (such as the 2008–2009
crisis), many of the crises in our sample are limited to individual
countries. Our main analyses are based on panel models with country
and year fixed effects and a country-specific time trend that enable us to
assess the impact of a banking crisis on unemployment and labor force
participation in the year the banking crisis starts as well as the five
subsequent years.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008;
Scarpetta et al., 2010), we find that unemployment increases sig-
nificantly and across the board in the aftermath of banking crises, but
these effects are especially strong for the youngest workers. In parti-
cular, in the five years following the event of a banking crisis, youth
unemployment (15–24) increases steeply, while the unemployment rate
of older workers (55–64) increases at a far more modest rate. We find
no significant effects for workers aged 65 and older. Across all age
groups, the impact on male workers is greater than that for female
workers. These unemployment effects are evident two years after the
start of a crisis and escalate in subsequent years, generally peaking four
years after the start of a crisis.
A connected question that we want to address is whether employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) can mitigate the impact of banking
crises on workers in different age groups. Using EPL data obtained from
the OECD (see Venn, 2009), we make a distinction between countries
with low and high employment protection. We find that the strength of
EPL in a country experiencing a banking crisis affects unemployment
outcomes significantly, with young and middle-aged workers more
adversely affected in low protection regimes in the short run. Strikingly,
there are some signs of a reversal of fortunes as time passes. Employees
in low protection countries are hardly protected in the short run and
tend to experience an increase in unemployment relative to those in
high protection countries in the medium run. Conversely, young
workers in high protection countries experience the downside of the
crisis as their unemployment rate increases strongly in the medium run,
relative to the peers in low protection countries. This suggests that EPL
can soften the initial blow of a crisis but, once this has passed, it may be
associated with economic costs as firms are forced to hold on to their
workers and/or are reluctant to hire new workers. As a result, adap-
tations have to be made and firms may start restructuring or down-
sizing, leading to lower hiring rates and a longer unemployment
duration for younger workers. Furthermore, whenever the effect of EPL
becomes visible, one can see clear age patterns in protection: young
workers (15–24 years) clearly have to bear the brunt of a banking crisis
as their unemployment rate is higher than those of older workers, in
particular in low protection countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized along the following lines.
Section 2 reviews the evidence on how banking crises impact on the
labor market, in theory and in the empirical literature. Section 3 de-
scribes the methodology, the models to be estimated, and the data.
Section 4 presents the empirical results of how banking crises affect the
unemployment rate and labor force participation rate. Section 5 extends
this analysis by taking a closer look at whether employment protection
legislation matters when it comes the unemployment position of the
various age groups. Section 6 concludes this paper and put the findings
in perspective.
The labor market impact of banking crises in theory and practice
The impact of a banking crisis
Banking crises are frequent events around the world and display
similar patterns (Kroszner et al., 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a,
2009b). Laeven (2011) observes that their causes lie in some combi-
nation of unsustainable macroeconomic policies, market failures, reg-
ulatory distortions, and/or government interference in the allocation of
capital. They occur in both developed and developing countries, al-
though their frequency is higher in developing countries where in-
stitutions concerning regulation, accountability and oversight are less
developed than in high income countries. However, in developed
countries, the impact of banking crises may be far larger because of the
interconnectedness and centrality of banks in these societies (Battiston
et al., 2016). Banking crises often originate from bank runs (Claessens
and Kose, 2013), such as that experienced by Northern Rock in the UK,
or more often from a meltdown of asset bubbles, predominantly in real
estate (Claessens et al., 2009). As a consequence, banking crises are
often found at the center of financial crises, although they often coin-
cide with other financial crises, such as collapses in asset prices, cur-
rency crises, and sovereign debt crises (Laeven, 2011).
The impact of a banking crisis tends to be protracted and difficult to
deal with using conventional macroeconomic policy instruments. A full-
blown banking crisis typically leads to a so-called credit crunch – a
severe reduction in the availability of credit – which in turn leads to
either bankruptcies or higher interest rates with negative repercussions
for investment and consumption spending (Eggertsson and Krugman,
2012; Romer and Romer, 2018). A second transmission channel can be
traced to debt overhang – high debt positions with reduced assets of
consumers, firms, and governments – that is associated with the after-
math of a banking crisis (Mian et al., 2014; Reinhart et al., 2012). Al-
leviating the macroeconomic consequences of a banking crisis is also
difficult because monetary policy often has lost its effectiveness when
dealing with a large-scale crisis. Falling investment and consumption
spending are hard to correct when consumer or investor confidence is
low, monetary authorities are preoccupied with saving financial in-
stitutions in their role as lender of last resort, or, as in the case of the
Great Recession, interest rates are approaching the zero bound and
government spending is a last resort for stimulating an economy.
The externalities of a banking crisis can be large, as a crisis is not
restricted to banks or financial institutions, but recessions can spill over
to other sectors of the economy and the lives of people (Antonova et al.,
2017; Karanikolos et al., 2013). Given the special role that banks play in
the allocation of funds in the economy, banking crises have the po-
tential of inflicting serious damage to the economy, resulting in fiscal
outlays to resolve any financial distress, collapses in output and in-
creases in unemployment. Laeven and Valencia (2013) estimate that
fiscal costs, net of recoveries, associated with banking crises are about
6.8 percent of GDP on average. However, there have been historic ex-
amples, such as Chile and Argentina in the early 1980s, Indonesia in the
later 1990s, and Iceland and Ireland in 2008, where this has been over
40 percent of GDP. Laeven and Valencia (2013) also estimate that
output losses following a typical banking crisis average approximately
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37 percent of potential output and around 33.7 percent of GDP. How-
ever, in some cases such as Ireland and Latvia in 2008 losses in output
were equivalent to more than 100 percent of potential GDP.
The labor market is a central domain within the economy where the
consequences of a banking crisis can become visible in terms of un-
employment rates and the duration of unemployment. Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009a, 2009b, who compare the employment performance of
countries in the aftermath of a number of severe banking crises, show
that on average these severe banking crises were followed by a 7 per-
centage point rise in the unemployment rate and it took on average
4.8 years before unemployment even started to fall. However, whilst
these aggregate data clearly show the negative impact of financial crises
in general and banking crises in particular on economic performance
and unemployment, they tell us little about the relative fortunes of
different age groups.
Previous studies have shown that business cycles tend to impact on
younger workers, those aged below 25 years, more than for workers
between 25 and 54 (Keeley and Love, 2010). Bruno et al. (2017) ex-
amine how systemic banking crises affect youth unemployment in the
short and the long run for a panel of OECD countries for the period
1981–2009. They demonstrate that younger workers (15–24 years) are
affected far more by a banking crisis than the average worker, both in
the short-run and the long-run. Unfortunately, neither of these studies
examine the impact on other age groups. In their analysis of the impact
of the Great Recession Cho and Newhouse (2013) do explore the ways
in which this crisis affected different groups of workers for a set of
middle-income countries or countries in transition. They found that
young men in particular were hit heavily by the crisis. However, in their
study of the effects of the Great Recession on European countries Groot
et al (2012) find that the ratio between youth unemployment and adult
unemployment during the recession was relatively constant. They
suggest that this is due to a possible substitution effect resulting in re-
duced effects of the crisis for older workers at the cost of the young.
Whilst these more age-disaggregated analyses are useful in highlighting
the potential differential effect of banking crises on different age groups
they are limited by the fact that they focus solely on the Great Reces-
sion. To extrapolate lessons from one large crisis, e.g. the Great Re-
cession, to banking crises in general is difficult as although this crisis
shared many features with other financial crises it also had some spe-
cific causes and consequences (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones, 2010). To
redress both these issues we use data on 41 banking crises in 38 de-
veloped countries between 1990 and 2014, to examine how banking
crises affect the labor market position of workers from five different age
groups, including those aged 65 years and older.
An additional issue when looking at the effects of a banking crisis for
different age groups of workers is the possibility that cohort sizes of the
population might affect labor market outcomes, e.g., in measuring the
long-run effects of adverse unemployment conditions during employment
conditions of young workers. Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) point out that
the effect of cohort size on labor force status might create serial correlation
of cohort specific outcomes of time. In the literature there is some ambi-
guity about the direction of this effect on labor force status (Garloff et al.,
2013; Shimer, 2001; Korenman and Neumark, 2000). Garloff et al. (2013)
note that decreasing cohort sizes, notably amongst younger cohorts, may
reduce unemployment rates in this age group due to less competition
among the workforce. Alternatively, they could increase unemployment if
companies reduce jobs disproportionately amongst that cohort. In order to
ensure that our results on labor market outcomes of different age groups
are not driven by cohort effects due to sizable or small cohorts entering or
exiting employment or the labor market we control for this potential
channel in our analyses.
Employment protection
An important issue when discussing the consequences of banking
crises is whether and how firms and welfare states can protect workers
from unemployment risks. The early consensus on this issue was sum-
marized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999: p.1172), who state that
“large differences in unemployment rates observed in industrialized
countries can be attributed to a large extent to differences in policy
towards employment protection legislation (which increases the dura-
tion of unemployment and reduces the flow into unemployment) and
the generosity of the welfare state (which reduces job creation)”.
However, the analysis of how employment protection legislation (EPL)
affects labor market outcomes when an economy is affected by a fi-
nancial crisis is an under-researched topic (an exception being Bernal-
Verdugo et al. (2013)). In the present paper, we offer some evidence on
whether an employment protection regime (high vs. low) matters when
a banking crisis occurs. A priori, one would expect that a high EPL
regime would be associated with less severe unemployment effects in
the short run following a crisis, but such a regime may impose higher
costs on firms which in turn lead to lower hiring rates and a longer
unemployment duration in the medium or long run compared to a low
EPL regime.1 As Blanchard et al. (2014) argue, the net effect of EPL may
be either positive or negative as the cost of laying off fewer workers
could be that the duration of unemployment will be longer. Indeed
Groot et al. (2011) find that, in their analyses of the impact of the Great
Recession on European economies, employment protection and strong
trade unions are more likely to protect employment in the short run but
they make employers more reluctant to hire in the long run. However, it
is also important to consider how these effects might be different for
different age groups. As Bennett and Möhring (2015) note, although
EPL should be ‘age blind’, in many countries it is implicitly biased to-
wards older workers as the level of legal protection depends on tenure.
As older workers have had greater opportunities to establish longer
tenure and, in most cases, higher pay, this would incur higher severance
payments if they were made redundant. This would therefore make it
more expensive for organizations to dismiss these workers (Chéron
et al., 2011). From this perspective, stricter EPL has a positive impact
on older workers by increasing job security and reducing the likelihood
of involuntary labor market exit. Based on the foregoing evidence one
would hypothesize that younger workers will be more affected by in the
short run as they are traditionally the ones with less experience and
fewer rights, and that this particular impact of a banking crisis will be
stronger in countries with low levels of EPL. However, following this we
would expect youth unemployment to drop more quickly in those
countries with lower EPL, e.g. more flexible labor markets, as compa-
nies seek to grow once the initial shock is over. Conversely, we would
expect to see lower levels of unemployment for older employees in high
EPL countries in the short run, compared to both younger workers in
those countries and older workers in low EPL countries. This is would
be in line with evidence from Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) that shows
that countries with lower EPL not only have higher dismissal rates for
older workers but also greater rates of labor market exit. However, in
the medium term we would expect to see this reversed as organizations
would be less willing or able to hire older workers.
Data and methods
Data
Our analysis focuses on a sample of 38 developed countries, which
is composed of the 28 European Union member states and all other
countries that are classified as “advanced economies” by the IMF (see
Appendix A for list of countries). We obtain annual data on the oc-
currence of a banking crisis for these countries from the Reinhart and
1 Compare the work of Bartelsman et al. (2016) who show how strong em-
ployment protection makes economies less resilient and able to adapt. This
could make the unemployment impact for each age group greater than it would
have been in a low EPL regime.
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Rogoff, 2009a, 2009b, 2011 database. We use their “banking crisis”
variable, defined as follows: “a banking crisis is marked by two types of
events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by
the public sector of one or more financial institutions; (2) if there are no
runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assis-
tance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions),
that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial
institutions.” For countries that are not in the Reinhart-Rogoff database,
we supplement their data with the banking crises database of Laeven
and Valencia (2013), who identify “systemic banking crises” using the
following two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress in
the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the
banking system, and/or bank liquidations); (2) Significant banking
policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the
banking system.” We refer to the original sources for more detail on the
banking crises definitions.
Our final sample consists of 41 banking crises in 38 developed
countries over the period 1990–2009. Our sample starts in 1990 since
that is the first year for which we can obtain unemployment and labor
market participation data for different age groups. Our crisis data end
in 2009 since that is the most recent year included in the Laeven-
Valencia database and it offers the possibility of tracking the impact of a
crisis up to five years after the start of the crisis.
Fig. 1 shows the number of countries experiencing a banking crisis
according to these two data sources in each year during our sample
period 1990–2009. Two observations stand out. First, in most years in
the sample period, only a minority of the countries in our sample ex-
perienced a banking crisis. At most 18 out of 38 countries (in 2008 and
2009) were in a banking crisis in any given year. This observation is
important since it implies that, for all banking crises in our sample, a
decent control sample of countries that were not in a banking crisis is
available. Second, of the 41 banking crisis episodes in the individual
countries in our sample, only 18 stem from the Great Recession. Most of
the other crises in our sample took place in individual countries during
the 1990s. Hence, our results will not be primarily driven by the Great
Recession and thus they carry more general implications.
We obtain annual country-level data on labor market indicators
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) database, including the
unemployment rate (i.e., the number of people who are unemployed as
a percentage of the total number of employed and unemployed people)
and the labor force participation (i.e., the number of people who engage
actively in the labor market, either by working or looking for work, as a
percentage of the working-age population) for men and women in five
different age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–54, 55–64, 65 and older, see
Appendix A for more details). The ILO defines unemployed people as
“all people of working age who were: (a) without work during the re-
ference period, i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment;
(b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employ-
ment or self-employment during the reference period; and (c) seeking
work, i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek
paid employment or self-employment.” The coverage of the labor force
participation data across countries and years is slightly better than the
coverage for the unemployment data. For comparability, we use the
common sample of country-year observations for which both the un-
employment rate and the labor force participation are available (by
gender and age group) in all analyses reported in the paper. For both
variables, we use data over 1990–2014, such that we can analyze the
effects of banking crises on labor market outcomes up to five years after
the end of our sample of banking crises over 1990–2009.
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for the labor market
variables used in this study for men and women and for the five age
groups. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the unemployment rates
for both men and women. The unemployment distribution across age
groups is quite skewed. On average, the youth unemployment rate
(15–24 years) of 17.3 percent is about three times as high as the un-
employment rate among older workers (55–64 years) of 5.5 percent.
Not surprisingly, there is also substantial variation in unemployment
rates across countries and years. For example, the maximum youth
unemployment rate in the sample was observed for Greece in 2013, at
58.3 percent, while youth unemployment in Luxembourg in 1991 was
only 2.6 percent. Patterns in the mean unemployment rates across age
groups are similar for men and women. We note that the number of
country-year observations is slightly smaller for the age group 65 and
older than for the other age groups.
Summary statistics for the labor force participation rates are dis-
played in Table 2. They reflect the well-known pattern that labor force
participation rates are higher for men than for women at all ages
(Grigoli et al., 2018), although the difference is relatively small for the
youngest age group (15–24 years).
To examine the differences in the impact of banking crises on labor
market outcomes across employment protection regimes, we use data
from the OECD-IDB database describing employment protection
Fig. 1. Number of countries in a banking crisis, 1990–2009. This figure
shows the number of countries in our sample of 38 developed countries that
experienced a banking crisis in each of the years from 1990 till 2009, based on
the databases of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b, 2011) and Laeven and Valencia
(2013). Our crisis data end in 2009 since that is the most recent year included in
the Laeven-Valencia database.
Table 1
Summary statistics of unemployment (for different genders and age groups).
Mean Min Median Max St. Dev. # Obs.
Panel A: Both genders, unemployment rate
Age group 15–24 17.27 2.59 15.31 58.29 9.35 859
Age group 25–34 8.48 1.56 7.56 36.06 4.69 859
Age group 35–54 6.12 0.85 5.37 22.43 3.57 859
Age group 55–64 5.46 0.00 4.64 23.17 3.43 859
Age group 65+ 1.99 0.00 1.45 21.36 2.12 817
Panel B: Men only, unemployment rate
Age group 15–24 17.14 2.73 15.60 56.19 9.05 859
Age group 25–34 7.95 0.53 7.18 32.85 4.51 859
Age group 35–54 5.84 0.53 5.04 21.47 3.69 859
Age group 55–64 5.86 0.00 5.01 21.10 3.67 859
Age group 65+ 1.89 0.00 1.32 22.50 2.25 839
Panel C: Women only, unemployment rate
Age group 15–24 17.50 2.50 14.92 63.90 10.30 859
Age group 25–34 9.17 1.18 7.80 39.85 5.49 859
Age group 35–54 6.56 0.56 5.56 26.28 3.93 859
Age group 55–64 4.95 0.00 4.15 25.83 3.45 859
Age group 65+ 2.20 0.00 1.34 40.00 3.11 835
This table presents summary statistics (the mean, minimum, median, max-
imum, standard deviation, and the number of country-year observations) of the
unemployment rate (the number of people who are unemployed as a percentage
of the total number of employed and unemployed people) for five different age
groups for both genders (Panel A), men only (Panel B), and women only (Panel
C). The sample consists of 38 developed countries over the period 1990–2014.
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legislation (EPL) in the OECD as well as some non-OECD countries. The
OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of
the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary
contracts.2 They are compiled from 21 items covering three different
aspects of employment protection regulations as they were in force on
January 1st of each year. For the purpose of this paper and in light of
the country coverage, we use a synthetic indicator (“Employment
Protection Regular Contracts” or EPRC) that refers to the strictness of
the employment protection for individual dismissals for employees with
regular/indefinite contracts covering the years 1985–2013 and it
comprises information on eight sub-indicators: (1) notification proce-
dures, (2) delay involved before notice can start, (3) length of notice
period at different tenures, (4) severance pay at different tenures, (5)
definition of justified or unfair dismissal, (6) length of trial period, (7)
compensation following unfair dismissal, and (8) possibility of re-
instatement following unfair dismissal. Because some data points were
missing for some countries, we categorize each country as belonging
either to a high or a low employment protection regime. To that end,
we first compute the mean EPRC for each country over the sample
period, and then categorize each country as belonging to a low or high
protection regime depending on whether the country’s mean EPRC is
below or above the median of the mean EPRC across all countries in our
sample.3
Methods
A main advantage of our approach to examine the labor market
effects of banking crises using a large number of crises in a substantial
number of countries over a prolonged time period is that we can esti-
mate panel models that effectively represent a “difference-in-differ-
ences” estimation in which countries that do not experience a banking
crisis are used as a control group for countries that are “treated” by a
banking crisis. In particular, we estimate panel models of the following
form:
= + + + + +
=
Y t BC X ,c t c t c c
k




where Yc,t is the labor market variable of interest (unemployment or
labor force participation for different genders and age groups) for
country c in year t; αc and αt represent country and year fixed effects,
respectively; tc denotes a country-specific time trend; BCc,t-k is a dummy
(indicator) variable indicating whether or not year t-k was the starting
year of one of the 41 banking crises in our sample for country c, based
on the databases of Laeven and Valencia, 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009a, 2009b, 2011; and Xcdenotes country-specific control variables
in various specifications, discussed in more detail below). In our em-
pirical implementation, we set the maximum k equal to 5, so that we
include the banking crisis dummy both contemporaneously and with
lags up to and including five years. This choice is motivated by Reinhart
and Rogoff’s (2009a) finding that the unemployment effects of banking
crises peak after 4.8 years.4
The coefficients γ0 through γ5 in panel regression (1) capture the
contemporaneous and up to five-year lagged impact of a banking crisis
on the labor market variable of interest and can be interpreted as
“difference-in-differences” estimates of the effects of banking crises that
implicitly take all countries not in a banking crisis as a control group.
The country fixed effects and year fixed effects absorb any time-in-
variant differences across countries in the variable of interest as well as
any global time variation in the variable of interest. This approach is
common in the prior literature (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). In
addition, to account for any country-specific secular trends over time in
the variable of interest, all our panel models include a country-specific
time trend.5 To take care that the results are not driven by the size of
cohort effects leaving and entering the labor market, we include the
share of all cohorts of the respective age groups in the population as
extra control variables in all of our analyses. In addition to these con-
trols, in robustness tests we also include variables for the country’s
political system (Worldbank, 2017), the occurrence of natural disasters
(EM-DAT, 2019), and the occurrence of violence or war (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2019) in each country-year to make sure that a banking
crisis is not mistaken for another (non-economic) crisis or event.
The key identifying assumption underlying this “difference-in-
Table 2
Summary statistics of labor force participation (for different genders and age
groups).
Mean Min Median Max St. Dev. # Obs.
Panel A: Both genders, labor force participation rate
Age group 15–24 48.52 24.62 47.00 76.49 13.51 859
Age group 25–34 83.91 70.29 84.78 93.97 4.30 859
Age group 35–54 83.77 64.19 84.18 94.11 5.59 859
Age group 55–64 49.89 17.41 49.31 88.74 14.92 859
Age group 65+ 8.81 0.95 6.50 39.65 7.21 817
Panel B: Men only, labor force participation rate
Age group 15–24 51.26 23.41 50.72 80.03 13.03 859
Age group 25–34 92.18 80.91 92.55 97.87 2.93 859
Age group 35–54 91.88 80.48 92.12 99.02 3.21 859
Age group 55–64 60.65 26.70 62.29 95.86 14.13 859
Age group 65+ 12.59 0.64 9.72 50.34 9.70 839
Panel C: Women only, labor force participation rate
Age group 15–24 45.66 19.45 43.87 78.07 14.39 859
Age group 25–34 75.47 45.84 76.76 92.92 7.87 859
Age group 35–54 75.63 35.97 77.10 92.55 11.07 859
Age group 55–64 39.87 9.21 39.03 85.29 16.84 859
Age group 65+ 5.72 0.27 3.60 35.82 5.62 835
This table presents summary statistics (the mean, minimum, median, max-
imum, standard deviation, and the number of country-year observations) of the
labor force participation rate (the number of people who engage actively in the
labor market, either by working or looking for work, as a percentage of the
working-age population) for five different age groups for both genders (Panel
A), men only (Panel B), and women only (Panel C). The sample consists of 38
developed countries over the period 1990–2014.
2 There are various indicators in use in research (see, e.g. Bernal-Verdugo
et al. 2013), but we have used this comprehensive indicator as it based on
actual information on labor market institutions and not like some sources, e.g.
Fraser Institute, and World Economic Forum, that rely on surveys. As noted by
Aleksynska and Cazes (2014) in a comparative report on labor market regula-
tion indicators call for “a cautious use of such indicators for research and policy
advice.” Comparative research based on different indicators can improve un-
derstanding of such institutions.
3 A cautionary note in interpreting these dummy variables capturing the
protection regimes is that this dummy variable obscures the fact that many
countries are in the middle. Furthermore, the mean computed for each country
masks that over the sample period some countries have witnessed changes
(albeit that on close inspection of the OECD indicator the values are quite stable
(footnote continued)
over the sample period).
4 Given the sample period of 2009–2014, using more lags would come at the
expense of losing a relative large fraction of our data in the panel regressions,
although we explore the effects of banking crises on unemployment up to ten
years after the start of the banking crises in our descriptive analyses below.
5We note that including a country-specific time trend in our panel model
regressions likely renders our estimated γk (k=1,..,5) to be conservative esti-
mates of the impact of banking crises on labor market outcomes, since this time
trend may pick up some of the effects of the Great Recession at the end of our
sample period. Indeed, our main results are stronger both statistically and
economically when we do not include a country-specific time trend, but this
specification also generates results for labor force participation that im-
mediately increases quite strongly for middle aged workers once a banking
crisis occurs whereas labor market research on labor force participation sug-
gests that participation only increases once the economic conditions improve
(cf Van Zandweghe, 2012; Krueger, 2017).
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differences” interpretation is that banking crises are exogenous to labor
market outcomes. Since the roots of banking crises lie in the financial
sector and since they pre-date economic downturns (Dell'Ariccia et al.,
2008), this assumption seems reasonable. Statistical significance of the
estimates of γk (k = 1,..,5) is assessed based on standard errors clus-
tered by country (Petersen, 2009). We carry out a host of robustness
relative to the baseline model specification in Eq. (1) (discussed in more
detail in section 4).
To study the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on
the labor market impact of banking crises for the various age groups, we
estimate similar panel regressions as in Eq. (1) but allow the coefficients
γk (k= 1,..,5) to vary across two groups of countries based on the EPL.
In particular, we distinguish between countries with low employment
protection and with high employment protection based on the median
value across countries of our EPL variable (“Employment Protection
Regular Contracts” or EPRC) averaged over all the years in our sample
for a particular country. The differential effects of banking crises on
unemployment in low and high employment protection countries can
be estimated by interacting the banking crisis dummy variable BCc,t-k in
Eq. (1) with a dummy variable for low vs. high EPL countries, as fol-
lows:
= + + + ×
+ × + +
=
=
Y t BC EPL
BC EPL X(1 ) ,









c t k c
Low









where EPLcLow is a dummy variable indicating countries in the low
employment protection regime. The estimates of k
Low and k
High
(k = 1,..,5) give the estimated effects of the banking crises at different
lags on unemployment in the low and high EPL regimes, respectively.
This approach allows for statistical (Lagrange Multiplier) tests on dif-
ferences in the impact of banking crises on unemployment between





Impact of a banking crisis on labor market outcomes
In this section, we examine the effects of a banking crisis on labor
market outcomes in our sample of 38 developed countries over the
period 1990–2014. In Section 4.1, we present the results for the un-
employment rate for men and women in five different age groups
(15–24, 25–34, 35–54, 55–64, 65+). In Section 4.2, we present the
results for the labor force participation.
Unemployment rate
We start out with a graphical analysis of the dynamics of un-
employment around the start of the 41 banking crises in our sample.
Fig. 2 depicts the results of a simple “event study” in which the average
unemployment rate for countries that experience a banking crisis is
plotted from two years before and up to ten years after the start of the
crisis (which is denoted as year 0 in the graph). The different lines show
the dynamics of unemployment for the five age groups.
A number of interesting observations arise from the graph. First, the
unemployment rate is flat on average in the two years before the start of
a banking crisis, lending credibility to our identifying assumption that
banking crises are exogenous to labor market outcomes. Second, for all
age groups except 65+, unemployment starts to pick up already in the
starting year of the banking crisis. Third, unemployment continues to
increase for these four age groups in the subsequent five years, peaking
at four or five years after the start of a banking crisis. Fourth, un-
employment does recover in the longer run, but even ten years after the
start of a banking crisis unemployment has not returned to pre-crisis
levels. Fifth, the unemployment impact of a banking crisis is more se-
vere for the younger age groups. In particular, young workers (aged
15–24) not only face the highest pre-crisis unemployment rate (at
around 13 percent) but also experience by far the greatest increase in
unemployment following a banking crisis, up to more than 22 percent
five years after the start of a crisis. After ten years, youth unemploy-
ment levels are still elevated compared to pre-crisis levels, at around 18
percent.6
The patterns in Fig. 2 provide some initial evidence that the un-
employment of banking crises is severe and long-lasting, especially for
younger workers. However, these patterns do not properly account for
the unemployment effects for a control group of countries not in a
banking crisis and could in part be explained by global business cycle
effects that happen to be correlated with the local occurrence of
banking crises. Also, since the figure is based on all countries in a given
event year for which data on the unemployment rate for different age
groups are available (and is thus not restricted to countries for which
unemployment rates are available in each year in the 13-year event
window – as that would lead to discarding many observations), the
pattern could also in part due to differences in the level of unemploy-
ment across countries. As discussed previously, a proper analysis of the
unemployment impact of banking crises therefore requires the estima-
tion of panels models expressed in Eq. (1) that include a control group
as well as country and year fixed effects. To be conservative, these
models further include a country-specific time trend. To ensure that this
parsimonious model offers robust insights we also carried out alter-
native models to be sure that the underlying idea of this event study
analysis is valid, viz. that the labor market dynamics of countries hit by
a banking crisis can be compared to those that are not hit by a
crisis. For matters of brevity they are not presented here, but these
robustness tests7 do not change the general conclusions in
Fig. 2. Dynamics of unemployment in different age groups around
banking crises. This figure shows the dynamics of the average unemployment
rate for five different age groups (both genders; in %) in an event window from
two years before till ten years after the start of a banking crisis (which is de-
noted as year 0). The sample consists of 38 developed countries over the period
1990–2014.
6 To assess to what extent our results are driven by the Great Recession
(during which 18 out of the 38 countries in our sample were in a banking
crisis), in unreported analyses we recreate Fig. 2 when ending our sample
period in 2007. The resulting graph is very similar.
7 These alternative models include: population weighted estimates; models
estimated separately for small and for large countries; models with leads of the
banking crisis dummy; models with additional control variables for political
system, natural disasters, and violence; models with a contemporaneous (Year
0) as well as up to five lags after a recession dummy (defined as country-years
with negative GDP growth) or GDP growth itself; models with sample
1990–2007 excluding the Great Recession; and models excluding the country-
specific time trend. The results of these robustness tests are available from the
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this paper.8 We only mention one of the robustness tests that is quite
crucial, viz. the assumption that the group of countries not in a crisis is
a good comparison group for the countries in a crisis.9 To test this
possibility we have included dummies of leads of banking crises (i.e.,
whether or not a crisis will hit in one year, in two years, in three years).
The main idea is that when these leads are close to zero, this indicates
that the control group is valid since the parallel trend assumption of the
difference-in-difference is satisfied (that is, there are no systematic
differences between treatment and control group before a banking
crisis). Model runs with these leads show that coefficients are indeed
close to zero and rarely statistically significant.
Table 3 presents the results of panel models to estimate the impact
of banking crises on the unemployment rate of the five different age
groups, for men and women combined (Panel A), men only (Panel B),
and women only (Panel C). The table shows the coefficients on the
contemporaneous (Year 0) banking crisis dummy as well as up to five
lags of the banking crisis dummy (Years 1 through 5).10 Table 3 also
reports both the overall R2 and the within R2 (that indicates the fraction
of variation in the dependent variable after removing country and year
fixed effects that can be explained by the independent variables) as well
as the number of country-year observations in the panel. Standard er-
rors are clustered by country.
The impact of banking crises on the unemployment rate is statisti-
cally and economically significant for both men and women in Table 3,
but certainly not for all age groups, and when the banking crisis be-
comes apparent (Year 0) one can detect no significant impact. It is
particularly the young and middle aged who are hit by the negative
consequences of a banking crisis, but this impact for all age groups only
becomes visible after some years. To illustrate the impact for men, one
year after the banking crisis the unemployment for young men (15–24)
immediately rises by 2.5 percentage points, increasing even further in
year 2 to 4.2 percentages points. From year 3 onwards, the impact
decreases, although by year 5 the banking crisis still leaves its mark on
youth unemployment as this rate is 2.3 percentage points higher than it
would have been without a banking crisis.
This type of impact for the young is consistent with prior studies
(Bruno et al., 2017; Scarpetta et al., 2010; Tanveer Choudhry et al.,
2012). The greater impact on their unemployment rate could be due to
the fact that their labor contracts generally tend to be of a temporary
nature and dismissing the young in the event of a crisis imposes fewer
costs on the employer than dismissing tenured and older workers.
However, at higher ages the unemployment impact of banking
crises is less well-examined. One can see in Table 3 that men above the
age of 25 experience the consequences of a crisis two years after they
occur. The impact is, however, far smaller than that observed for the
young. For instance, the unemployment rate of older men (55–64 years)
only started to increase in year 2 by 1.9 percentage points, which is
more than half the impact for the young; and the same applies to some
degree for later years. The absence of an effect for both men and women
65 years and older stands to reason, as in most countries one cannot
claim any unemployment benefits at these ages and it is only by the
registering process of labor force surveys that people can be defined as
unemployed.
For women, the unemployment impact of banking crises tends to be
more muted than for men. Young women experience a significant in-
crease in the unemployment rate of up to 2.6 percentage points two
years after the start of a crisis, reverting back to 2.2 percentage points in
year 5. The impact of the crisis on the unemployment rates for women
is also noticeable for the age brackets 35–54 years and statistically
significant in years 2 and 5. For all women below the age of 55, we find
that by year 5 unemployment has risen significant.
The overall R2 and within R2 of the panel models in Table 3 indicate
that, while the country and year fixed effects account for the vast ma-
jority of the explanatory power of the panel models, the six banking
crisis dummies, relative cohort controls, and the time trend contribute
up to 8 percent of the explanatory power for regular working ages
among men and around 7 percent for women (3 percent for women of
55–64 years), for the 65 years and older the explanatory power drops to
around 2 to 3 percent.
Overall, Table 3 indicates that banking crises are associated with
large and long-lasting negative unemployment effects for women and
especially for men, and most notably (but not exclusively) for young
workers. We note that, although many of the coefficients in Table 3 are
both economically and statistically significant, there is reason to believe
that they potentially underestimate the actual effects of banking crises
on unemployment, since the country and time fixed effects and country-
specific time trend may all to some extent absorb some of the “real”
effects of banking crises. As a result, the 10 percentage points un-
employment effect for young men and women observed in Fig. 2
shrinks to an estimate effect of only up to around 3.5 percentage points
in Panel A of Table 3.
Labor force participation
Table 4 presents the results of similar panel models as in Table 3,
but with the labor force participation rate for different age groups as
dependent variable. Overall, the results are much weaker. The short run
impact of banking crises on the labor force participation rate (see
Table 4) is negligible for all age groups. The absence of labor force
participation effects, together with the previously noted unemployment
impact of banking crises, suggests that unemployment developments
are primarily the result of employment developments as opposed to
developments in people’s active engagement in the labor market by
looking for work. In other words, banking crises cause firms and gov-
ernments to decrease their labor demand and do not result in an in-
crease in labor supply. This insight deepens our understanding of the
labor market impact of banking crises and – as far as we know – has not
been documented before.
Still, there are some sizeable and interesting effects to be seen in
Table 4. If we restrict our attention to sizeable effects at the 5 percent
significance level, we note two important effects. First, one can detect
amongst older men (55–64 years) a “discouraged worker” effect, visible
in year 4: illustrated by a decrease in labor force participation of 1.2
percentage points in year 4. These effects may arise from the employee
themselves, being discouraged by their lack of labor market prospects
in times of crisis or perhaps triggered by well-intended but badly de-
signed social insurance programs (Inderbitzin et al., 2016). But it may
also be a choice that has been induced from the employer side. Em-
ployers may want try to “lay off” workers by using early retirement
programs (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2013), thereby softening the in-
come blow for older workers if they had to dismiss them and let their
older employees use unemployment insurance programs.
A second and novel effect to be noted from Table 4 is the increase in
labor force participation of women aged 65 years and older (and to a
limited extent of men). Between years 2 and 4 one can see an increase
in participation amongst this group of 0.5–0.6 percentage points. These
(footnote continued)
authors upon request.
8 We note, however, that our results are considerably weaker when adding
lags of a recession dummy or of GDP growth itself, suggesting that the labor
market effects of banking crises stem from their impact on overall economic
conditions. Banking crises differ from regular recessions in that recessions as-
sociated with banking crises tend to be deeper than other recessions (Claessens
et al., 2009).
9 We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this test.
10 We restrict the number of lags in the panel models to five – as opposed to
ten lags in the event study in Fig. 2 – since the use of ten lags would lead to
discarding a considerable fraction of the data in light of the relatively short
sample period for the banking crises data of 1990–2009. Fig. 2 suggests that
five-year lags suffice to capture the maximum impact of the banking crisis on
unemployment.
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effects may not seem large in an absolute sense, but considering the low
unconditional mean labor force participation for women aged 65+ age
of only 5.7 percent (see Table 2), these effects are relatively large for
the age group itself (around 10 percent in the medium run relative to
the unconditional mean). The fact that this age group, normally seen as
pensioners, increases their participation on the labor market after a
banking crisis may have a myriad of causes. The relatively recent turn
in increasing labor force participation of older workers (55–64 years)
can be ruled out as a major cause as this study focuses on banking crises
in general and not just the most recent crisis. What unites banking crises
may very well be the fact they generate uncertainty in financial markets
and hence may affect the private assets and compulsory accumulated
savings within pension funds or insurance companies. Especially in
countries where (private) pension contracts are based on a defined
contribution basis, dwindling assets may become directly visible and
trigger potential retirees to continue working or perhaps retire and at
Table 3
Panel models of the impact of banking crises on unemployment (for different genders and age groups).
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 R2 Within R2 # Obs.
Panel A: Both genders
Unemployment rate (15–24) 0.857 2.165* 3.338** 2.837** 2.322* 2.471*** 0.858 0.080 660
Unemployment rate (25–34) 0.203 0.974 1.913** 1.369* 1.188* 1.369*** 0.846 0.084 660
Unemployment rate (35–54) 0.376 0.900 1.602*** 0.850* 0.747 0.858*** 0.846 0.075 660
Unemployment rate (55–64) −0.057 0.435 1.374** 0.906 0.577 0.887** 0.818 0.065 660
Unemployment rate (65+) −0.224 −0.544 0.216 0.281 −0.004 −0.114 0.636 0.018 626
Panel B: Men only
Unemployment rate (15–24) 0.982 2.494* 4.167** 3.582** 2.785** 2.274*** 0.814 0.085 660
Unemployment rate (25–34) 0.287 1.106 2.273** 1.871** 1.506** 1.390*** 0.789 0.088 660
Unemployment rate (35–54) 0.462 1.020* 1.951*** 1.222** 0.820 1.074*** 0.821 0.076 660
Unemployment rate (55–64) 0.030 0.792 1.904*** 1.275* 0.878 1.207*** 0.793 0.080 660
Unemployment rate (65+) 0.686 −0.404 −0.186 0.212 0.058 −0.333 0.515 0.024 645
Panel C: Women only
Unemployment rate (15–24) 0.672 1.747 2.561* 2.004 1.678 2.147** 0.889 0.066 660
Unemployment rate (25–34) 0.052 0.747 1.412* 0.666 0.747 1.293*** 0.898 0.073 660
Unemployment rate (35–54) 0.271 0.752 1.143** 0.415 0.589 0.598* 0.885 0.074 660
Unemployment rate (55–64) −0.038 0.044 0.677 0.467 0.134 0.529 0.808 0.034 660
Unemployment rate (65+) −1.091 −0.551 0.765 −0.394 0.611 0.031 0.495 0.033 641
This table present the results of panel models to estimate the effect of the start of a banking crisis on unemployment in the same year (Year 0) and in the five
subsequent years (Year 1 through Year 5). The dependent variable is the unemployment rate (the number of people who are unemployed as a percentage of the total
number of employed and unemployed people) for five different age groups for both genders (Panel A), men only (Panel B), and women only (Panel C). The
independent variable is a dummy variable indicating the starting year of a banking crisis that is included both contemporaneously (Year 0) and up to and including
five lags (Year 1 through Year 5). All panel models include country and year fixed effects as well as a country-specific time trend and control variables for relative
cohort size (not reported in the table). The final three columns report the overall R2, the within R2, and the number of country-year observations included in the panel
model. The table reports the coefficients and their significance (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, using standard errors clustered by
country). The sample consists of 38 developed countries over the period 1990–2014.
Table 4
Panel models of the impact of banking crises on labor force participation (for different genders and age groups).
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 R2 Within R2 # Obs.
Panel A: Both genders
Labor force participation rate (15–24) 0.200 −0.078 −1.088 −0.703 −0.810 −0.312 0.975 0.026 660
Labor force participation rate (25–34) 0.327 0.446 0.012 0.273 −0.055 −0.052 0.952 0.037 660
Labor force participation rate (35–54) 0.046 0.189 0.314 0.389 0.324 0.116 0.982 0.047 660
Labor force participation rate (55–64) 0.371 0.568 0.095 −0.447 −0.839* −0.516 0.989 0.038 660
Labor force participation rate (65+) 0.057 0.229 0.616* 0.637** 0.592** −0.148 0.976 0.066 626
Panel B: Men only
Labor force participation rate (15–24) −0.147 −0.417 −0.900 −0.447 −0.616 −0.215 0.970 0.024 660
Labor force participation rate (25–34) 0.361 0.330 −0.147 0.215 0.059 −0.068 0.919 0.025 660
Labor force participation rate (35–54) 0.115 0.217 0.334 0.307 0.278 −0.108 0.957 0.037 660
Labor force participation rate (55–64) −0.108 0.322 −0.502 −0.718 −1.221** −0.830 0.985 0.059 660
Labor force participation rate (65+) −0.295 0.115 0.556 0.773 0.640* −0.449 0.977 0.074 645
Panel C: Women only
Labor force participation rate (15–24) 0.560 0.271 −1.285* −0.973 −1.012 −0.413 0.975 0.030 660
Labor force participation rate (25–34) 0.333 0.602 0.225 0.372 −0.140 −0.005 0.969 0.044 660
Labor force participation rate (35–54) −0.033 0.141 0.267 0.453 0.356 0.323 0.992 0.046 660
Labor force participation rate (55–64) 0.742 0.705 0.579 −0.244 −0.497 −0.215 0.990 0.020 660
Labor force participation rate (65+) 0.331 0.442 0.632** 0.540* 0.541* −0.045 0.969 0.048 641
This table present the results of panel models to estimate the effect of the start of a banking crisis on labor force participation in the same year (Year 0) and in the five
subsequent years (Year 1 through Year 5). The dependent variable is the labor force participation rate (the number of people who are unemployed as a percentage of
the total number of employed and unemployed people) for five different age groups for both genders (Panel A), men only (Panel B), and women only (Panel C). The
independent variable is a dummy variable indicating the starting year of a banking crisis that is included both contemporaneously (Year 0) and up to and including
five lags (Year 1 through Year 5). All panel models include country and year fixed effects as well as a country-specific time trend and control variables for relative
cohort size (not reported in the table). The final three columns report the overall R2, the within R2, and the number of country-year observations included in the panel
model. The table reports the coefficients and their significance (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, using standard errors clustered by
country). The sample consists of 38 developed countries over the period 1990–2014.
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the same time keep on working part-time to compensate for the fall in
income from assets (Szinovacz et al., 2015).
Taken together, the results in this section indicate that the strong
and long-lasting impact of banking crises on unemployment is accom-
panied by relative minor labor market participation effects, implying
that the unemployment effects primarily stem from labor demand
forces. In the next section, we address the question whether labor
market legislation can help to alleviate the unemployment effects of
banking crises.
How effective is employment protection legislation?
An important topic in labor market policies is whether employment
protection legislation (EPL) offers real protection in the short and long
run in the face of a crisis. A banking crisis would in that respect put an
EPL system sufficiently to the test. In this section, we examine this issue
by splitting up the sample according to whether the level of employ-
ment protection in a country is above the median value of protection
(termed “high protection”) or below that value (termed “low protec-
tion”). We study how the unemployment rates of the various age groups
are affected by the banking crisis in the two employment protection
regimes (high vs. low).
Table 5 shows the results of panel models expressed in Eq. (2) in
which the coefficients on the different lags of the banking crisis dummy
are allowed to be different across both groups of countries. The table
contains the coefficient estimates for the contemporaneous as well as
five lags of the banking crisis dummy for both regimes separately, as
well as the results of a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test on the significance
of the difference in the coefficients across both regimes for all in-
dividual lags (Year 0 through 5) separately. We note that the table
presents the results of five different panel models (one for each age
group, men and women combined) for each of which 12 coefficients are
shown (coefficients for Year 0–5 for High and Low protection coun-
tries). R2′s are suppressed for space considerations. The results in
Table 5 thereby present an overview of the short and medium run
impact of banking crises on the unemployment rate for different age
groups in the different EPL regimes for workers with regular employ-
ment contracts.11
The differences in the short run effects across the two regimes are
quite striking and in line with expectations: in the low EPL regime, all
workers are immediately negatively affected in the year the banking
crisis starts (year 0), whereas in high protection regime the un-
employment rate of all workers is hardly affected. This applies in a
more pronounced manner for years 1 and 2. For example, young
workers (15–24) in low EPL countries face a substantial increase in
their unemployment rate starting from 2.6 percentage points in year 0
Table 5
Panel models of the impact of banking crises on unemployment: Low vs. high employment protection.









Unemployment rate (15–24) 2.572*** −0.542 4.874** 2.932** 1.438 1.246
Unemployment rate (25–34) 1.124** −0.544 5.221** 1.429** 0.544 1.630
Unemployment rate (35–54) 1.144*** −0.299 6.427** 1.180** 0.606 1.133
Unemployment rate (55–64) 0.981** −0.914 10.085*** 0.814 0.076 1.707
Unemployment rate (65+) 0.151 −0.678 2.056 −0.495 −0.693 0.130
Year 2 Year 3
Low protection High protection LM test Low protection High protection LM test
Unemployment rate (15–24) 4.527** 2.198 1.975 2.265 3.051* 0.221
Unemployment rate (25–34) 2.709** 1.151 2.291* 0.884 1.541 0.578
Unemployment rate (35–54) 2.164** 1.016 2.953* 0.580 0.895 0.219
Unemployment rate (55–64) 1.940** 0.836 2.498 0.690 0.921 0.108
Unemployment rate (65+) 0.453 −0.154 0.797 0.332 0.121 0.096
Year 4 Year 5
Low protection High protection LM test Low protection High protection LM test
Unemployment rate (15–24) 0.970 3.333* 2.222 0.956 2.897** 1.640
Unemployment rate (25–34) 0.880 1.471* 0.520 0.716 1.512** 1.031
Unemployment rate (35–54) 0.414 1.047* 0.983 0.202 0.999** 1.704
Unemployment rate (55–64) 0.583 0.695 0.029 0.324 0.859 0.705
Unemployment rate (65+) −0.167 0.177 0.283 −0.305 −0.418 0.034
This table present the results of panel models to estimate the effect of the start of a banking crisis on unemployment in the same year (Year 0) and in the five
subsequent years (Year 1 through Year 5) separately for countries with low and high employment protection. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate for
five different age groups. The independent variable is a dummy variable indicating the starting year of a banking crisis that is included both contemporaneously (Year
0) and up to and including five lags (Year 1 through Year 5). The countries are divided into two groups based on the median value of the average unemployment
protection laws as proxied by EPRC (regular contracts, including additional provision for collective dismissals) across all the years for a particular country. The
coefficient on the banking crisis dummy is allowed to be different for the groups of countries with below median (low protection) and above median (high protection)
average EPRC values within the same panel model. All panel models include country and year fixed effects, a country-specific time trend, and control variables for
relative cohort size (not reported in the table). The table reports the coefficients and their significance (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, using standard errors clustered by country) as well as the test statistic and significance of a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests that assesses whether the effects are
the same across the two groups of countries. The sample consists of 38 developed countries over the period 1990–2014.
11 To examine whether the estimation results are different for those em-
ployees working on the basis of temporary contracts, we also estimate the
impact of banking crisis across different EPL regimes with respect to temporary
contracts (as approximated by the OECD indicator EPT). The general picture
presented in this paper is by and large the same for temporary contracts and is
for matters of brevity not presented here (but available upon request for in-
terested readers).
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and increasing to 4.5 percentage points in year 2. These effects are
highly statistically significant and considerably stronger than those
observed in Table 3 for all countries combined. In contrast, young
workers in high EPL countries do not experience a significant increase
in their unemployment rate in years 0, 1 and 2. These patterns are si-
milar, though somewhat less pronounced, for the other age groups,
consistent with the finding in Table 3 that young workers suffer the
most in the wake of banking crises.
However, when we look at the medium run effects of banking crises
on workers in the different regimes, a clear pattern emerges. In the low
protection regime, the unemployment effects turn out to be temporary,
as the coefficients for years 4 to 5 are relatively small and statistically
insignificant for all age groups. Hence, employment opportunities re-
cover within several years after the start of a banking crisis. In contrast,
in the high protection regime, significant detrimental labor market ef-
fects start to materialize three to five years after the start of a banking
crisis. In particular, we see that the unemployment rate in years 4 and 5
increase substantially for the young and middle-aged workers. For ex-
ample, young workers in the high EPL regime face a medium run in-
crease in their unemployment rate of around 3 percentage points, while
middle-aged workers (25–34) and (35–54) witness their unemployment
deteriorate by 1 to 1.5 percentage points.
This result may seem counterintuitive, but could actually be a sign
that low protection regimes are more adaptive and incur the “pain” of a
crisis as soon as possible and start restructuring, thereby being able to
reap the benefits of this strategy (Bartelsman et al., 2016; Gnocchi et al.,
2015; Martin and Scarpetta, 2012). The high protection regime, on the
other hand, offers true protection in the short run, but the downside of a
high degree of protection may be a lack of resilience and, in case of a
deep recession, firms are bound to keeping their workers on the payroll
in spite of losses. In the medium run, this strategy may no longer be
sustainable, leading firms to downsize or stop hiring regardless and
hence the unemployment rate of young and middle aged workers starts
to increase.12
In sum, the results in Table 5 suggest that while EPL can alleviate
the short run adverse labor market consequences of banking crises,
imposing strong employment protection can result in less flexible labor
markets that seem to be associated with significant economic costs that
are born in particular by young workers in the medium and long run.
Conclusion and discussion
The financial crisis of 2009 has made governments and citizens
aware that a banking crisis can have long-lasting negative social con-
sequences (Zingales, 2015). Trying to uncover those consequences and
making the social costs of a crisis visible is the main contribution of this
paper. By pulling together the data on 38 developed countries that
experienced at one time or another a banking crisis it has been possible
to examine how younger and older people bear the brunt of such a crisis
and how employment protection may soften the blow of a crisis, but in
so doing perhaps distort the ability of labor markets to adjust over time
(Coile and Levine, 2007; Coile and Levine, 2011).
Our analysis makes four distinctive contributions. First, the few
prior studies that examine the labor market consequences of financial
crises tend to focus on individual crises and/or individual countries
(Scarpetta et al., 2010; Cho and Newhouse, 2013; Axelrad et al., 2018).
An important advantage of our approach to studying a large number of
crises in many countries over a prolonged period of time is that we can
estimate panel models that effectively represent a “difference-in-dif-
ferences” estimation in which countries that do not experience a
banking crisis are used as a control group for countries that are
“treated” by a banking crisis. The key identifying assumption that
banking crises are exogenous to labor market outcomes seems reason-
able since banking crises originate in the financial sector and pre-date
economic downturns (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008). Furthermore, we con-
trol for country and year fixed effects (to account for time-invariant
country characteristics as well as global time effects such as common
business cycle effects across countries) as well as relative cohort sizes
and a country-specific time trend (to account for any secular trends over
time that may vary across countries). As a result, our analyses are po-
tentially more powerful in isolating the impact of banking crises on the
labor market outcomes for different age groups.
Second, our study is the first to jointly examine the unemployment
and the labor market participation effects of banking crises for fine-
grained age groups. A focus on both variables may help us see how
various age groups suffer but also recover over time when a banking
crisis occurs. It is to be expected that some workers are laid off during a
crisis, thereby affecting the unemployment rate directly. But another
adjustment channel could be that a crisis affects the labor force parti-
cipation of the work force, either in a negative manner – by discoura-
ging workers who thus withdraw from the labor market – or in a po-
sitive manner – by encouraging potential workers, who in case of crisis
may feel compelled to start searching for paid employment to supple-
ment their pension or household income.
Third, in prior papers that offer an international perspective on the
effects of financial crises, the age groups are often broad (Cho and
Newhouse, 2013; Bernal-Verdugo et al., 2013) or sometimes the focus is
only on young workers (Bruno et al., 2017; Tanveer Choudhry et al.,
2012), and labor market research generally neglects the group of men
and women that work beyond the age of 65 (Hoynes et al., 2012). In
this paper, we offer a more detailed analysis of how various relatively
narrow age groups – both men and women and including those above
65 – fare on the labor market in terms of unemployment and labor force
participation.
Fourth, this paper yields new insights into the effects of employment
protection legislation (EPL) on the labor market impact of financial
crises for the various age groups. The extent to which EPL can alleviate
the labor market pain of different age groups in the aftermath of
(banking) crises is an important policy issue that deserves more re-
search (and replication), certainly as the labor market impact of crises
on various age categories will gain attention in aging societies.
Our main results show that, in the aftermath of a banking crisis, the
younger workers in particular bear the brunt of a crisis in terms of
higher unemployment rate. We find that employment protection is a
mixed blessing for young and middle-aged workers. In high protection
countries, they initially fare much better compared to their peers in low
protection countries, but in the medium run they face considerably
larger increases in their unemployment rate.
Across all age groups, we find no immediate impact of banking
crises on labor force participation, but we do find significant effects for
some age groups in the medium run (after 2–5 years). In particular,
male workers in the pre-retirement age group (55–64 years) show some
signs of withdrawal from the labor market four years after a crisis This
is in line with other studies that show how early retirement programs
are a common strategy to downsize firms and deal with older workers
(Van Dalen and Henkens, 2013). In contrast, female workers aged
65 years and over increase their labor force participation two to four
years after a crisis.
These results on labor force participation are an important com-
plement to the findings of prior studies on unemployment and broaden
our understanding of the impact of financial crises on labor market
outcomes. Of particular interest are our results on the labor market
12 We note that, while the LM test indicates that the differences in the un-
employment effects of banking crises across the low and high protection re-
gimes are statistically significant in years 0 and 2, the differences are not sig-
nificant at conventional significance levels for the other years. The lack of
significance of the LM test statistics for years 3–5 may be due to the increased
imprecision of the coefficient estimates, as the impact of banking crises on
unemployment rates becomes harder to identify multiple years after the start of
the crises, as other forces affecting unemployment likely become relatively
more important.
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experience of workers aged 65 and older, especially because the current
literature generally focuses on standard working age definitions up to
65. Our analysis shows that the impact on the unemployment position
of this particular age group of men and women is negligible, whereas
the labor force participation of women 65 and older increases by
around 0.5 percentage points 2–4 years after the crisis. This absolute
change in labor force participation may not be large, but it is substantial
considering that the mean female labor participation rate for those age
65 and older in our sample is only 5.7 percent. Thus, older female
workers (65 and older) experience increased pressures from a banking
crisis to prolong and increase their participation in the labor market (by
almost 10 percent in the medium run relative to the unconditional
mean participation).
Needless to say, this study is subject to a number of limitations;
limitations that are tightly connected to the highly aggregated nature of
the data sets used. First of all, as Claessens and Kose (2013) note
banking crises can be particularly challenging to exactly date. The start
of a crisis has usually been dated using a qualitative approach on the
basis of a combination of events, such as forced closures, mergers, or
government takeover of many financial institutions, runs on several
banks, or the extension of government assistance to one or more fi-
nancial institutions. The end of a banking crisis is also difficult to
identify, in part since its effects can linger on for some time. Notwith-
standing these issues we have employed definitions and data on
banking crises from two high-quality, reputable databases which have
been used in a number of other studies. However, future research is
needed to establish exactly how the labor market effects of banking
crises in combination with labor market institutions materialize. What
makes these assessments particularly difficult is that aggregate un-
employment rates hide the information necessary to make a clear-cut
evaluation, and labor market research on how EPL is structured and
enacted shows that the devil is often in the details (Blanchard and
Landier, 2002; Blanchard et al., 2014; Boeri and Van Ours, 2013; Kahn,
2007; Kahn, 2012; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). More detailed
insights into the effects of different types of labor market regulation and
protection are obvious candidates for future research.
Despite these limitations, the above-mentioned insights generated
from studying the labor market impact of banking crises in developed
countries around the world offer food for thought. Governments not
only have to deal with the direct consequences of banking crises, but
most governments are also in the midst of reforming labor markets to
deal with ageing populations. These reforms are not only inspired by
traditional demographic forces, but also because governments are
trying to lengthen the working life in order to make public pension
systems financially sustainable (Blundell et al., 2016; Henkens et al.,
2018). Jaimovich and Siu (2009) show how ageing labor markets can
have a strong impact on business cycle fluctuations and as societies age
they may become less flexible as labor market institutions are still based
on a demography of the distant past. The key question for the future is
how economies will recover from recessions or depressions as the im-
pact has to be borne by someone. Traditionally, the young are the ones
who suffer most from economic downturns, but when this group be-
comes smaller, the impact of crises has to be borne by older partici-
pants. This may increase the costs from recovery as the older workers
generally have more firm-specific human capital, whereas the young
are still involved in their search for a good job/profession match
(Gervais et al., 2016) and switching jobs is less costly provided un-
employment duration is limited. Our study shows how in the recent
past labor markets have adapted to banking crises. The current study
suggests that extensive and strict employment protection may have
short-run protection but in the medium-run it can be a burden as the
unemployment rate among the young and middle-aged increases. This
is in strong contrast to countries that are more flexible and offer little
protection. The policy implications of these labor market outcomes in
response to banking crises are on the one hand self-evident, as they
demonstrate the importance of preventing banking crises in terms of
regulation and monetary policy. The evidence of the impact of crises on
youth unemployment rate show that these can be large and long-lasting
(cf. Bruni et al., 2017). On the other hand, the implications are more
complex for those countries that offer extensive and strict employment
protection. Simply reforming those institutions by dismantling them
may offer no solace. Instead those countries have to be aware that
employment protection has to be complemented by fiscal efforts to
moderate macroeconomic fluctuations in the aftermath of a banking
crisis and more so than countries that offer little protection (see also
Kawaguchi and Murao, 2014, p. 113).
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Appendix A. Data description
Countries in dataset
Our sample thus includes the following countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
the U.K., and the U.S.
Labor force dataset
The data for labor force participation rates by age and gender are
available for the following age groups: 15+, 15–24, 15–64, 25–54,
25–34, 35–54, 55–64 and 65+. We focus on the following five age
groups relevant: 15–24, 25–34, 35–54, 55–64 and 65+ However, the
data for unemployment rate by age and gender are only available in 10-
year age bands (15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65+). Therefore,
to ensure comparability between the two measures, we compute the
unemployment rates for those aged 35–54. To do this, we use two ad-
ditional data series from the ILO: the number of people who were un-
employed by age and gender, and the number of people in the labor
force by age and gender. These data series are also presented in 10-year
age bands. We thus add the values for those aged 35–44 and those aged
45–54 to calculate the total number of people who are unemployed
aged 35–54 and the total number of people in the labor force aged
35–54. This then gives us the same age bands as for the labor force
participation data. We then calculate the unemployment rate for all five
age groups as the number of people who are unemployed as a percent of
the total number of employed and unemployed people (i.e., the labor
force). We compare the computed values for the age groups 15–24,
25–34, 55–64, and 65+ against the values for the unemployment rate
in the ILO dataset to ensure that they are accurate.
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